Reports on the anniversary of the Normandy landings: alternative allies

by Sebastian Köhler
[This article posted on 6/8/2024 is translated from the German on the Internet, https://www.telepolis.de/features/Berichte-ueber-den-Jahrestag-der-Landung-in-der-Normandie-Alternative-Alliierte-9753520.html.]

Meritorious, but not exclusive: US troops in Normandy, 1944. Image: Everett Collection, Shutterstock.com

What is history, what do the media make of it? This question was raised this week in view of the commemoration of the Second World War. A Telepolis media fragment.

80 years of D-Day – the anniversary of the Normandy landings is a topic in almost all media. Not surprisingly, reporting in this country is characterized by the geostrategic conflict situations. Why attributes are sometimes important in news – and to what extent the 6th of June 1944 also has a not entirely unimportant “prehistory”.

On the occasion of the 80th anniversary of “D-Day” on June 6, 2024, many German media outlets reported that “the Allies” had landed on the west coast of France in 1944. The public media ARD-Tagesschau, ZDF-heute and rbb-inforadio are exemplary in this regard, the latter documented here pars pro toto by screenshot because it cannot be accessed via a link:

Quote from the homepage of rbb24-Inforadio:

In France, the celebrations to commemorate the 80th anniversary of the deployment of Allied soldiers on D-Day have begun. On June 6, 1944, almost 160,000 soldiers landed in Normandy, marking the beginning of the liberation of Europe from Nazi rule (...).

These descriptions can hardly be considered a simple mistake or typo, as they unfortunately happen again and again in the media – including here and in my own writing. No, because the language is largely consistent, one could say: in unison. This has been the case for years in many print and online media, with an increasing tendency – and now, in 2024, it is almost the same everywhere. Which doesn't make it any better.
The Allies had already fought decisive battles before that

The fact is and remains that the “Allies” of the anti-Hitler coalition definitely did not land in Europe on that day. Because if it were not so serious in terms of history and world politics, one could say, as in the story of the hare and the hedgehog: they were already there. Always. Namely in the east of Europe.

The Soviet Union, even if this fact is hardly present in this country at the moment, was one of the three main allied powers, along with the USA and Great Britain. To be enlightened about this, even the online encyclopedia Wikipedia is enough:

The military alliance of the three main Allied powers, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and the United States, with other states, is referred to as the Anti-Hitler coalition (or Grand Alliance, Russian: Антигитлеровская коалиция) and opposed the Axis powers in the Second World War: the German Reich under the leadership of Adolf Hitler, the fascist Kingdom of Italy and the Empire of Greater Japan. The United Nations emerged from the Anti-Hitler Coalition in 1945 (...) The Anti-Hitler Coalition was officially founded under the name United Nations after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and the declaration of war by Germany and Italy on the United States in December 1941. 26 states sent delegates to the Arcadia Conference, which took place in Washington, D.C. from December 1941 to January 1942 (...) In addition to the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union, Australia, Belgium, China , Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, India, Yugoslavia, Canada, Cuba, Luxembourg, New Zealand, Nicaragua, the Netherlands, Norway, Panama, Poland, South Africa and Czechoslovakia. The countries occupied by Germany took part through representatives of their governments in exile. On January 1, 1942, they all adopted a declaration directed against the Tripartite Pact, the United Nations Declaration.

The fact that the historically justified term “allies” now explicitly excludes the Soviet Union in the prevailing usage of the term can hardly be described as anything other than a retouching of history.
Power politics

A special case of “history is what the victors write”. Apparently the USSR is no longer one of them. It seems to be a power-political and media practice, in view of the current geostrategic confrontation and Russian aggression against Ukraine since February 2022, to deny the Soviet successor state Russia this, possibly positively connoted “ally” status more than ever.

Incidentally, this linguistic usage also stands out every year in February, when the bombing of Dresden by “allied bombers” in 1945 is commemorated: however, it was in fact British and US bombers, and not Soviet ones, that flew these attacks and dropped the bombs.
View of the bombing of Dresden

Sometimes, in news reports that are supposed to be informative, attributive adjectives are not only possible, but even necessary in order to achieve the greatest possible objectivity.

In the case of both the bombing of Dresden and the Normandy landings, it would be appropriate to refer to the three main allies simply as the “western allies”. This would not be so difficult if the aim were to be as objective as possible.
Suddenly, only D-Day counts

The special twist to this year's D-Day seems to be the following: D-Day would have “ushered in” the liberation of Europe from Nazi rule, as mentioned above. What? Not a word about the first major defeat of the German Wehrmacht by the Red Army outside Moscow in the winter of 1941/1942. No mention of the Soviet troops' breaking of the fascist blockade of Leningrad in January 1943.

And apparently no knowledge of the devastating defeats of the armies of Hitler's Germany at Stalingrad and in the Kursk arc in 1943. All this would not have long since “ushered in the liberation of Europe from Nazi rule” in its own way?

Such a current historical amnesia or even extremely one-sided presentation of historical facts in the journalistic media can hardly be interpreted in any other way than as an adaptation, even over-adaptation, to the prevailing power and geopolitical climate. Because what should not be can't be?

Or as the, excuse me, Russian writer Anton Chekhov (1860 to 1904) so profoundly put it many years ago: “Everything in the world is justified by history.”
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The lust of US presidents for nuclear Armageddon
by Jeffrey D. Sachs
[This article posted on 6/3/2024 is translated from the German on the Internet, https://www.telepolis.de/features/Die-Lust-der-US-Praesidenten-am-nuklearen-Armageddon-9745409.html.]

Doomsday Clock

The last five US presidents have moved closer to the nuclear abyss. Jeffrey Sachs calls for a commitment to peace. The path he outlines. A guest article.

The primary responsibility of every US president is to ensure the security of the nation. In the nuclear age, this means above all preventing nuclear Armageddon. However, Joe Biden's reckless and incompetent foreign policy is taking us closer to annihilation.

In this way, Biden joins a long line of presidents who have toyed with nuclear Armageddon and are no different from each other in this regard. This also applies to his immediate predecessor and current rival Donald Trump.
Nuclear weapons and nuclear war on everyone's lips

The media has been full of talk about nuclear weapons and nuclear war in recent days and weeks.

The leaders of NATO countries want to defeat Russia and even see it dismembered, and they tell us not to worry about Russia's 6,000 nuclear weapons.
Jeffrey Sachs is an American economist, political analyst and professor at Columbia University.

Ukraine is using NATO-supplied missiles to knock out parts of Russia's early-warning system for nuclear attacks.

Meanwhile, Russia is conducting nuclear weapons exercises near its border with Ukraine.

US Secretary of State Antony Blinken and NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg have given Ukraine the green light to use NATO weapons to attack Russian territory as an increasingly desperate and extremist Ukrainian regime sees fit.
There is a risk of nuclear war

These leaders have put us all at great risk by failing to heed the most fundamental lesson of the nuclear standoff between the United States and the Soviet Union during the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis.

President John F. Kennedy, one of the few American presidents in the nuclear age to have fought for the survival of us all during the negotiations, told us and his successors after the end of the Cuban missile crisis:

Above all, in defending their own vital interests, the nuclear powers must avoid those confrontations which force an opponent to choose between a humiliating retreat or nuclear war. To embark on such a course in the nuclear age would be to demonstrate the bankruptcy of our policy – or a collective death wish for the world.

But that is exactly what Biden is doing today, by pursuing a bankrupt and reckless policy.
Nuclear war possible even by accident

A nuclear war can easily result from an escalation of a conventional war, or from a hot-headed leader with access to nuclear weapons launching a surprise first strike, or even by accident.

We know today that the latter almost happened, even after Kennedy and his Soviet counterpart Nikita Khrushchev had negotiated a compromise to end the Cuban missile crisis in 1962.

At that time, a disabled Soviet submarine almost fired a nuclear torpedo at American warships, which was only prevented by the skin of its teeth (see also the translator's note at the end of this article).
Doomsday Clock – ever closer to the abyss

When Clinton took office in 1993, the Doomsday Clock showed 17 minutes to midnight, but that time had been reduced to nine minutes by the time his presidency ended.

Bush reduced this time span to just five minutes, Obama to three minutes and Trump to just 100 seconds. Now, under Biden, the Doomsday Clock is at 90 seconds to midnight.

Most presidents and most Americans are not aware of how close we are to the abyss.

The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, which was founded in 1947 to save the world from nuclear annihilation, invented the Doomsday Clock to make the public aware of the extent of the threat we are actually facing. National security experts adjust the clock depending on how close we are to “midnight” at the end of each year, which is a euphemism for global annihilation.

The scientists have recently set the clock to just 90 seconds before midnight, closer than ever before in the atomic age.
Doomsday Clock – a yardstick for evaluating US presidents

The clock is a useful yardstick for measuring which presidents have “understood” the threat and which have not.

The sad fact is that most presidents have recklessly jeopardized our survival in the name of “national honor,” to demonstrate their personal resolve to counter political attacks from warmongers, or out of sheer incompetence.

According to this simple and straightforward assessment, only five presidents since 1945 have done the right thing by extending the time until midnight, while nine of them have brought us closer to Armageddon, including the last five presidents. Truman was president when the Doomsday Clock was set at seven minutes to midnight in 1947. Truman fueled the nuclear arms race and when he left office the clock was only three minutes to midnight.

Eisenhower continued the nuclear arms race, but also entered into the first negotiations with the Soviet Union on nuclear disarmament. When he left office, the clock was reset to seven minutes to midnight.
Kennedy saved us in the Cuban Missile Crisis

Kennedy saved the world by keeping a cool head during the Cuban Missile Crisis, rather than following the advice of hot-headed advisors who called for war (for a detailed account, see Martin Sherwin's masterful book Gambling with Armageddon, 2020).

In 1963, after the Cuban Missile Crisis, Kennedy successfully negotiated the Partial Test Ban Treaty with Khrushchev.

At the time of Kennedy's assassination, which may have been the result of a CIA coup against his government due to his peace initiative, JFK had reset the Doomsday Clock to twelve minutes to midnight. That was a great historical achievement.

Unfortunately, however, this situation was not to last.

Lyndon Johnson soon escalated the situation in Vietnam, so the clock was reset to just seven minutes to midnight.

Richard Nixon then defused tensions with the Soviet Union and China somewhat and concluded the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (Salt I), which reset the time to midnight again.

But Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter failed to negotiate Salt II, and Carter made the fateful and unwise decision to give the CIA the green light to destabilize Afghanistan in 1979.

And when Ronald Reagan took office in 1981, the clock was down to just four minutes to midnight. But Reagan and his successor George Bush Sr., who worked successfully with Gorbachev, also deserve the credit for ending the Cold War, which in turn led to the end of the Soviet Union itself in December 1991.
Gorbachev worked for an end to the Cold War

The next twelve years marked the end of the Cold War. A large part of the credit for this goes to Mikhail Gorbachev, who wanted to reform the Soviet Union politically and economically and end the confrontation with the West.

When Bush Sr. left office in 1993, the Doomsday Clock was at 17 minutes to midnight, the most favorable time since the beginning of the atomic age in 1945.

At that time, Russia explicitly and unequivocally said “yes” to peaceful and cooperative relations with the USA. Unfortunately, however, the US security establishment did not accept this answer.

While the Russians wanted to end the Cold War, the US wanted to “win” it. They declared themselves the only superpower and the rules of a new and US-led “rule-based world order” were to be determined unilaterally by them.

The US therefore began a series of wars after 1992 and expanded its vast network of military bases around the world at its own discretion, constantly and ostentatiously crossing the red lines of other nations and even aiming to force nuclear opponents into humiliating retreats.
Every US president since 1992 has promoted nuclear annihilation

Therefore, it is regrettably true that since 1992, every US president has brought the world closer to nuclear annihilation than his predecessor had already done.

The Doomsday Clock was at 17 minutes to midnight when Clinton took office, but only nine minutes to midnight when he left. Bush reduced this time span to just five minutes, Obama to three minutes, and Trump to just 100 seconds to midnight. Now Biden has reduced it to just 90 seconds.

Biden has led the US through three brilliant confrontations, each of which could end in Armageddon.
More articles by Jeffrey D. Sachs:
USA votes against full UN membership for Palestine
Continued colonialism: Why London and Washington are preventing Palestine from becoming a UN member
Telepolis
The end of diplomacy
The less diplomacy, the greater the risk of nuclear war
Telepolis

By insisting on an expansion of NATO to include Ukraine, regardless of Russia's bright “red line”, Biden has repeatedly demanded Russia's humiliating withdrawal.

By unconditionally siding with Israel in what is probably a genocidal war in Gaza, he has fueled a new arms race in the Middle East and an increasingly dangerous escalation of the Middle East conflict.

By mocking China over Taiwan, which the US supposedly recognizes as part of China, he is stoking a possible war with China.

Trump has fueled nuclear threats on several fronts in a similar manner, most blatantly in the confrontation with China and Iran.

In Washington, all the key politicians seem to be of one mind these days: more money for wars in Ukraine and the Gaza Strip, more weapons for Taiwan. We are getting closer and closer to Armageddon.

But polls show that the American people overwhelmingly disapprove of US foreign policy, and their opinion counts for very little. That is why we must now seize every opportunity to work hard for peace. The survival of our children and grandchildren depends on it.

Jeffrey Sachs (1954, Detroit, Michigan) is an American economist and professor. He received his doctorate in economics from Harvard University in 1980. Sachs' career has been marked by various academic positions and advisory roles for major international organizations such as the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. As director of the Center for Sustainable Development at Columbia University and as a professor, he is deeply committed to sustainable development.

Sachs is particularly well known for his significant role in the development of economic policies in Eastern Europe during the transition from communism to capitalism. He is considered an advocate of global poverty reduction.

Sachs' achievements in economics have earned him numerous awards and honors. His work and his commitment to a more just world economy have extended his influence far beyond the boundaries of academia. In “The Price of Civilization: Reawakening American Virtue and Prosperity” (2011), he addresses issues of US society and economy.

Telepolis has published a series of articles by Sachs on the background, course and impact of the Ukraine war and Israel's war in Gaza. Like John J. Mearsheimer, Sachs is one of the outstanding US scholars who take a clear, realistic and critical position on the disastrous US foreign policy.

The present article by Jeffrey D. Sachs, entitled “Presidents Who Gamble With Nuclear Armageddon”, was published on May 29, 2024 on the US website Common Dreams. This text follows on from an article by Sachs, which was recently published in Telepolis under the title “The Less Diplomacy, the More Nuclear War”.

The present article was translated into German by Klaus-Dieter Kolenda with the author's permission and provided with some subheadings. In addition, he refers to a reference by Sachs in his above text about a possible “nuclear war by mistake”, which was only narrowly avoided after the Cuban missile crisis, to an article in Telepolis that also deals with this topic, entitled “War in Ukraine: Use of nuclear weapons possible again”.

Translator: Klaus-Dieter Kolenda, Prof. Dr. med., specialist in internal medicine – gastroenterology, specialist in physical and rehabilitative medicine/social medicine, was head physician of a rehabilitation clinic for diseases of the cardiovascular system, the respiratory tract, the metabolism and the musculoskeletal system from 1985 to 2006. He has been working as a medical expert for the social courts in Schleswig-Holstein since 1978. He also works with the Kiel group of the IPPNW (International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War and for Social Responsibility). E-mail: klaus-dieter.kolenda@gmx.de

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Nuclear war by mistake: “Deepfakes and cyber attacks could have an impact”
by Andreas von Westphalen
[This article posted on 6/3/2024 is translated from the German on the Internet, https://www.telepolis.de/features/Atomkrieg-aus-Versehen-Deepfakes-und-Cyberangriffe-koennten-Auswirkungen-haben-9744782.html.]

Cybersoldiers

AI increases the risk of military escalation. The complexity of the nuclear threat could become uncontrollable. The expert sees only one solution. (Part 2 and conclusion)

In the first part of this interview, Prof. Karl Hans Bläsius, an expert in artificial intelligence, discusses the role and dangers of AI in modern warfare. He emphasizes that autonomous weapons systems, although efficient, raise ethical and security concerns because they cause destruction and death.

The risk of unpredictable interactions, similar to the “flash crashes” in financial markets, can lead to uncontrollable escalations. Bläsius emphasizes that Israel is already using AI for target designation and that this can be problematic if human review is lacking.

The complexity and time pressure of military decisions require the use of AI, but the uncertainty and incompleteness of the data can lead to erroneous decisions. In the Ukraine war, AI is used to assess the situation, which increases the risk of escalation, especially through nuclear threats and possible false alarms in early warning systems.

Bläsius warns of an “accidental nuclear war” that could be triggered by misunderstandings and misinterpretations.
Increased risk due to the war in Ukraine

▶ You are also a co-founder of the interest group “Atomkrieg aus Versehen” (Nuclear War by Mistake). Why do you see the need to warn against the danger of a “nuclear war by mistake”?

Karl Hans Bläsius: As early as the 1980s, I was already concerned about the risk of an “accidental nuclear war”, for example as a result of a computer error. From around 2016, I had the impression that the risk of a nuclear war was increasing again and in 2019 I set up the website atomkrieg-aus-versehen.de to draw attention to these risks, as in my view they were far too little known.

My greatest fear was that climate change in the coming decades would make many regions uninhabitable, forcing people to move elsewhere, which would lead to crises and conflicts, making any error in an early warning system increasingly dangerous and eventually leading to a “nuclear war by mistake”.

In my view, the risk of an “accidental nuclear war” has now also increased significantly due to the war in Ukraine.
September 26, 1983

▶ Have there been any situations in the past where a nuclear war was narrowly avoided?

Karl Hans Bläsius: Yes, there have been a number of such situations in which it was only by a stroke of luck that an “accidental nuclear war” was avoided. In particular, there were some very dangerous situations during the Cuban Missile Crisis.

One incident that became particularly well known was on September 26, 1983: a satellite in the Russian early warning system reported five attacking intercontinental missiles. Since the satellite was found to be functioning correctly, the Russian officer on duty, Stanislaw Petrow, should have passed on the warning in accordance with regulations. However, he considered an attack by the USA with only five missiles to be unlikely, did not want to be responsible for a third world war and decided that it was a false alarm, despite the data.

▶ You are convinced that the complexity of nuclear threat situations will increase to an almost uncontrollable degree. Can you please explain this in more detail?

Karl Hans Bläsius: In recent years, a new arms race has begun in various military dimensions. Most of these developments are still in their infancy and their consequences are almost impossible to calculate. This applies to new delivery systems for nuclear weapons, such as hypersonic missiles, the planned weaponization of space, the expansion of cyber warfare capabilities and the increasing use of artificial intelligence systems, including autonomous weapons systems.

All of these aspects also play a role in early warning systems for detecting attacks with nuclear missiles and will significantly increase the complexity of these systems. Potential cyber attacks, in which components or data of an early warning system could be manipulated, are also incalculable.
Disinformation and deep fakes

Disinformation and deepfakes can also play a role here. Deepfake techniques can be used to create audio and video files in which a person speaks any text, with the pronunciation and image matching that person so well that the forgery is barely recognizable.

It can be particularly dangerous if hackers manage to connect to a conference to evaluate a nuclear alert, establish a connection with a “fake” president and make them say whatever they want. The fact that operating teams know that everything (for example, audio and video recordings) may be fake can also lead to great uncertainty at conferences to evaluate alerts in crisis situations.
Probability is not certainty

▶ In November 2023, the Pentagon published its strategy for the introduction of AI technologies. It states that “the latest advances in data, analytics and AI technologies are enabling leaders to make better decisions faster, from the boardroom to the battlefield”. Why don't you share this optimism?

Karl Hans Bläsius: Of course, such processes can be improved and accelerated with the help of AI. However, it is also true here that such decisions have to be made in an uncertain context and that AI results are not certain, but only have a certain probability. Our normal everyday knowledge is usually vague, uncertain and incomplete, and this also applies to such military contexts. The problem of uncertainty cannot be solved by technical means.

A Telepolis article published on February 11, 2024 warns against the use of AI systems. The background to this was that a study based on experiments with various generative AI systems had come to a frightening conclusion. The scientists write: “We observe that the models tend to develop a dynamic of an arms race, which leads to major conflicts and, in rare cases, even to the use of nuclear weapons.”
AI models tend to war

▶ How can this behavior of AI be explained?

Karl Hans Bläsius: It is not easy to explain this, and further research is certainly needed. Such escalating behavior could have various causes.

A fundamental problem in AI is often the huge search spaces, i.e. a large number of alternatives that underlie a decision in individual situations. This also applies to generative AI systems, where there are many possible alternatives for a next action or response in each situation, and it is important to make the best or even optimal selection from these many alternatives. The individual alternatives are usually weighted, and a selection can be made on this basis according to certain strategies and heuristics.

With the aim of improving system behavior, it is possible to attempt to evaluate the success of an action and, on this basis, to change the weights of possible operations.
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Does artificial intelligence increase the risk of an accidental nuclear war?
June 2, 2024 Andreas von Westphalen
[This article posted on 6/2/2024 is translated from the German on the Internet, https://www.telepolis.de/features/Beguenstigt-Kuenstliche-Intelligenz-die-Gefahr-eines-Atomkriegs-aus-Versehen-9744434.html.]

Drone

AI weapon systems can drive escalation spirals. They lack the ability to make rational decisions. What this can lead to. (Part 1)

Interview with Prof. Karl Hans Bläsius, Professor of Artificial Intelligence at the University of Applied Sciences in Trier and operator of the websites atomkrieg-aus-versehen.de and ki-folgen.de, about AI in modern warfare and the dangers for humanity.

▶ Prof. Bläsius, artificial intelligence plays a decisive role in the design of autonomous weapons systems today. How do you assess this development?
Karl Hans Bläsius is a retired professor of computer science and artificial intelligence.

Karl Hans Bläsius: Autonomy in technical systems is not a bad thing in principle. I also hope to see autonomous cars, so that I can drive even when I am very old. Autonomous robots can also be very useful in dangerous environments. Of course, the military also wants more autonomy in weapons systems, as this can achieve more in complex environments and tight timeframes.

However, we are talking about weapons that are designed to destroy and kill, so different standards should apply here. On the one hand, we should not be aiming for the automation of killing anyway, and on the other hand, more autonomy is possible for all weapons systems, and this could lead to particularly dangerous developments, including in connection with nuclear weapons, for example in the case of autonomous submarines, aircraft or cruise missiles.

▶ In high-frequency trading on the financial markets, unforeseen interaction processes between different algorithms repeatedly occur, leading to massive price crashes within seconds (so-called “flash crashes”).
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Can fully autonomous weapons systems also lead to such unpredictable interactions between the automatic systems that result in an unforeseen chain reaction of autonomously guided attacks and counterattacks?

Karl Hans Bläsius: Yes, this risk is also described in a report from October 2020 entitled “Autonomous Weapons Systems” by the Office of Technology Assessment at the German Bundestag. The term “flash war” is also used here. In very short periods of time, competing systems could launch attacks and counterattacks that are no longer controllable or manageable by humans, thus leading to an escalation spiral.

Such a chain reaction would also be conceivable with autonomous internet agents. Such a “flash war” could therefore also occur on the internet. Some generative AI systems comparable to ChatGPT are already in use on the internet, and more will follow. Many companies and countries are currently working on generative AI systems. In addition to humans, bots could also ask questions and tasks to these systems. It is to be expected that there will soon be interactions between these systems themselves.

This could give rise to new dangers, especially if these systems have the ability to launch cyber attacks. A system like ChatGPT could be instructed by humans, bots or another generative AI system to carry out cyber attacks. Other generative AI systems with which it already interacts could detect this and launch counterattacks.

Without human intervention, a chain reaction could quickly develop between these systems, with increasingly powerful cyberattacks, a “flash war” on the internet. These systems would then be de facto autonomous cyber weapons. Even though current systems are not yet technically capable of this, it is to be expected that extensions will be activated at regular intervals, which may have such capabilities at some point in the next few years or very soon.

▶ Is artificial intelligence already being used today, for example, to determine military targets in wars? And if so, how do you assess this?

Karl Hans Bläsius: Yes, Israel uses such AI-based systems to identify Hamas fighters and their suspected locations. This involves the use of extensive surveillance data and the identification of large numbers of targets for attack. Telepolis has also reported on this several times (here, here and here).

It is extremely questionable whether such automatically determined targets are still checked by humans for correctness. Because it is obviously a matter of a larger number. If that is not the case, then in the end a machine decides who is killed, including civilians who fall victim to these attacks. This is unacceptable.

▶ Military actions often take place under extreme time pressure and in a highly complex situation. Therefore, the increasing use of artificial intelligence is of course a natural way to deal with the vast amounts of data and to make a decision. Do you think this is problematic?

Karl Hans Bläsius: Due to the complexity and short time frames, it will become increasingly necessary to use AI techniques. However, such decisions are usually made in an uncertain context. The data available for a decision is usually vague, uncertain and incomplete.

With vague values such as the size or brightness of objects, there is a continuous spectrum between “not applicable” and “applicable”. Corresponding characteristics therefore only apply to a certain extent and this is not always certain, but they may only apply with a certain probability.

In addition, important information for a decision may be missing. AI also has techniques for solving problems and making decisions based on vague, uncertain and incomplete data.

However, such decisions are only valid with a certain probability and can be wrong. This is a limit that applies in principle, no matter how good AI systems may become. Human decision-makers should always be aware of this problem.

▶ You have already mentioned it: the frequently heard demand that the final decision on life and death must be made by a human being can turn out to be a sham control. After all, whether a human being can evaluate the information in the short time available and reject the AI's decision is questionable, isn't it?

Karl Hans Bläsius: Yes, that is very questionable. In many cases, it is difficult for humans to verify automated decisions, because they are often based on hundreds of weighted features, from which an overall result is calculated using a special evaluation formula.

Such a solution, i.e. the justification for a decision, is usually not easy to understand. A review could take several hours or even days, which is usually not enough time. This will apply especially in a military context.

If the decision result itself cannot be easily and quickly evaluated by humans, the only option left to humans is to believe what the machine delivers. Over time, successful and correct AI decisions will also lead to an increase in trust in such systems, making it increasingly difficult for humans to oppose the machine's decisions.

In particular, people could be held accountable to a particular extent if they decide differently from what the machine suggests and this turns out to be wrong. The requirement that the final decision on life and death must be made by a human being, i.e. the principle of “man in the loop” must apply, could turn out to be a sham control. After all, it is questionable whether a human being can evaluate the available information in the time available and thus have a suitable basis for his decision.

▶ Specifically, perhaps with regard to the war in Ukraine: to what extent do you see your fears regarding the use of AI there being confirmed?

Karl Hans Bläsius: AI is being used in the Ukraine war, for example to provide a detailed military situation report on the basis of which suitable targets can be determined. A software program from the American company Palantir is being used for this. Telepolis has also reported on this. Drones are also particularly important in this war, although I am not aware of the extent to which AI and autonomy play a role here.

▶ Do you see a risk of an escalation spiral in the Ukraine war?

Karl Hans Bläsius: Yes, I see a great risk here. There have been nuclear threats since the beginning of the war. The effects of a nuclear war can be so severe that even in times of crisis and war, there is a great reluctance to use nuclear weapons.

Nevertheless, various scenarios are conceivable in which it could come to use. The use of nuclear weapons cannot be ruled out if a nuclear power finds itself in a situation that it finds unacceptable, although it is almost impossible to predict from the outside under what circumstances this would apply.

This will apply to Russia at least if the Russian Federation finds itself in an existential emergency, although it is also unclear under what conditions such a situation would arise. However, the risk of nuclear war can also depend on chance, for example if a nuclear attack is reported due to a fault in an early warning system for nuclear threats, although none exists, i.e. it is a false alarm.

In these cases too, the data basis for recognizing such attacks is vague, uncertain and incomplete. Therefore, automatic systems cannot make a reliable decision in such situations either. The context, i.e. the global political situation, must be taken into account for the assessment.

Other events that could be associated with such an alert could also lead to such a report being assessed as genuine.

Furthermore, in times of war, such an attack could be more likely to be attributed to an enemy. The nation that is supposedly under attack must consider launching its own nuclear missiles before the enemy's missiles strike, making it more difficult to respond.

This could then lead to a “nuclear war by mistake”. Threats to use nuclear weapons are just as irresponsible as attacks on components of the nuclear forces of a nuclear power.

Such events can easily lead to misunderstandings and misinterpretations, and thus to an accidental nuclear war. This also applies to the attacks on Russian early warning systems that have become known in recent days, which have significantly increased the risk of escalation.

Part 2: Nuclear war by mistake: “Deepfakes and cyber attacks could have an impact”

Karl Hans Bläsius is a retired university lecturer. He received his doctorate from the University of Kaiserslautern in 1986 for a thesis on artificial intelligence. From 1990 to 2017, he represented the field of knowledge-based systems in the computer science department at the University of Applied Sciences in Trier. His research focused on document analysis, with the results of these projects also being applied in practice through the establishment of companies. Now retired, he is teaching a course on “Computer Science and Society” at the University of Applied Sciences in Trier, which also deals with the risks of an accidental nuclear war in connection with computer science and AI. As a result of this work, the website www.atomkrieg-aus-versehen.de was set up in 2019.

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The search for an alternative form of social organization beyond the market and the state
by Meinhard Creydt
[This article posted on 6/1/2024 is translated from the German on the Internet, https://www.telepolis.de/features/Suche-nach-einer-alternativen-Vergesellschaftung-jenseits-von-Markt-und-Staat-9743447.html?seite=all.]

A gear wheel with economic growth surrounded by the people

In capitalism, the economy and capital often grow against the population. How can society reorganize itself to enable more control?

Economic activity (on markets) and the growth of wealth (as capital) are becoming independent of the population. How can society organize itself in such a way that it enables a higher degree of control and design of social processes?
From the criticism of problem marketing...

In a market economy, suppliers can often only sell their products to the extent that certain problems exist and are not being addressed or overcome. Assuming that the causes of the problems and the problems themselves remain untouched, those affected seek compensation or overcompensation. The following examples illustrate this thesis.

A central reason for the high sales of the automotive industry is that people are dependent on cars due to the poor state of public transport. In addition, many popular products serve or presuppose ideological ideas or an ideological subjectivity. This applies, for example, to the so-called car culture (see Creydt 2017, 98–101) and the home of one's own (see Bourdieu 1999).

A large proportion of food is produced for consumers who have little time, skills or desire to prepare a meal carefully. They prefer fast food and products that, with their high sugar and salt content, directly appeal to something like the psychological reward center.

Highly processed foods such as hamburgers, French fries or chicken nuggets in fast food restaurants provide the body with refined, i.e. nutrient-poor, carbohydrates, added fats and other additives that are not available for purchase and therefore make the food “something special”.
Häfliger (2024)

Such foods can make people addicted. Even the Frankfurter Allgemeine Sonntagszeitung now says:

Poor nutrition – and obesity – is not the fault of the individual, but the result of the omnipresence of unhealthy foods.
Kuroczik (2023)

Nevertheless, it is still widespread to individualize health problems: “You are to blame for your own health problems!”
... on the attention paid to the social structure

Awareness of these problems can lead to an awareness of the constitutive connections between living conditions, lifestyle, offers and needs. This awareness is dedicated to the question “What contributes to people preferring certain content and not others?”

An alternative form of socialization to the capitalist market economy and state socialism requires a different kind of awareness of the interactions between economic sectors and social areas. For example, it is becoming clear how the way in which agriculture is practiced, the low prices for its products and the demand (power) of retail corporations are interrelated.

This awareness of concrete qualitative interconnections runs counter to the profit-oriented motives, constraints and dynamics of the economy. It is able to relate work, needs, motives and lifestyles to one another in a different way.

Such an awareness is also critical of the widespread notion of spontaneous autonomy: “What is useful to me and what I like, I feel quite authentically from within myself”.

Concrete ideas emerge as to what good agriculture or mobility with priority for public transport might look like. The insight has spread that such prevention of illness is needed, overcoming the burdens and contradictions in work and the economy that promote illness, as well as unhealthy nutrition. Society cannot then leave it at medicine as a repair shop.
New connections between previously separate groups

Secondly, alternative socialization can build on new social connections between workers, consumers and those indirectly affected by work and consumption.

Such connections can be found, for example, in the alliance between environmentally conscious farmers, nutrition-conscious consumers and environmentalists. In the fight against the closure of hospitals and their privatization, workers and the local population can come together.

At Volkswagen, for example, there are already so-called vehicle clinics; they are not there to repair vehicles, but to discuss them. Market researchers present the model designs to selected families and note down their wishes and suggestions for improvement” (Schieritz 2023).

Such institutions must be emancipated from their narrow focus on the sales promotion of individual companies and opened up to joint consultation between consumers and producers on meaningful products. “Idea generators, experts, users and producers” can come together in “public development workshops for product development and innovation” (Birkhölzer, in research project 1994, 31).

In the capitalist market economy, the various workforces are also separate from and opposed to each other. The cooperation between different companies (development cooperation, long-term coordination between suppliers and producers, etc.) and private ownership of the means of production are in conflict. Company secrets ensure that work collectives and research and development projects are sealed off from each other.

Those affected experience this as detrimental to their work. Through mutual job shadowing and consultation, it would be possible – after overcoming private ownership of the means of production – for workers from different companies to learn from each other, to discuss best practices and to learn from each other.

At present, it is only on the markets that it becomes clear whether the product exceeds or undercuts the average social standards. “If production takes place at different production sites,” “the production methods and conditions within a sector” must be “equalized”. In a market economy, this equalization takes place through “antagonistic competition” (Leichter 1923, 32).

Instead of taking this detour, “it would be much easier and more expedient to […] stop being secretive and […] sit down together in the various workshops to exchange experiences of production and improve the production process in solidarity with each other” (ibid., 31).

The market is not without competition, either as a “knowledge processing machine” (Herzog 2023) or as a form of coordination. However, according to the current state of discussion, a post-capitalist society faces the problem of getting along poorly with markets as well as without them (see Creydt 2020).

So far, there are no satisfactory answers to the question of the relationship between social organization and markets in a post-capitalist society. However, it is possible to indicate which elements of a market economy can be eliminated for good reasons (see Creydt 2022).

The need for an alternative form of socialization arises to the extent that those affected become aware of one thing: they are negatively affected by the divisions and oppositions that result from private property, competition and the imperatives of the profit economy.

If the population no longer wants to be the dependent variable of self-referential and independent economic processes, it must “develop competencies in the strategic places that are now occupied by capital or management” and “by market effects […] in the course of things: in the places that decide on the bringing together of the elements of the social process” (Haug 1993, 106f.).

The capitalist market economy involves separating what belongs together and at the same time creating problematic links. Alternative socialization reassembles the various moments of social production and reproduction.

It is already important today to leave well-trodden paths in our thinking, to break down entrenched links and to analyze how previously misdirected potential can be used differently.
The preferences of socially meaningful work

A third aspect of alternative socialization arises from the change in work motivation. In the capitalist market economy, companies act according to the maxim: “The main thing is that the product can be sold. The assessment of the motives of consumers for buying and the question of what the products or services ‘do’ to the customers are of secondary importance. It is not the content of the products and services that is decisive, but that their production increases capital.”

In post-capitalist society, producers and service providers work in such a way that their products and services promote the human potential of their customers and they see themselves as their trustees and representatives.

They treat the customers' affairs as if they were their own, without ignoring the differences between the experiences and competencies of producers and customers, experts and laypeople.
Relating quality and quantity to each other

According to the defenders of the market economy, prices are a shorthand that makes it possible to communicate all the necessary information quickly and efficiently.

In the meantime, the insight is spreading that prices are under-complex information concentrates. Those who want to evaluate the activities of companies and organizations will have to include more qualitative indicators. At present, for example, the MIPS (material intensity per service unit), the DGB index “good work” or the Human Development Index exist.

An information infrastructure for product line analyses, technology impact assessments and environmental impact assessments is already emerging, which runs parallel to pricing. These make the effects, conditions and feedback associated with the work and work products tangible.

These can be used as a basis for “concepts of a ‘non-financial’ or social-ecological accounting system” or “multidimensional success concepts” (Pfriem 2011, 188).

They form a fourth moment of alternative socialization. Common good balances are an example of this. It is not only the efficiency of the company or organization that needs to be balanced, but also its contribution to a good life.

What is needed is a “material-multidimensional concept of value” as opposed to the maxim “value is what costs or brings money” (Freimann 1984, 22). In the “multi-dimensional value calculation”, which also takes into account the qualities that are difficult to quantify, “the degree of social welfare can only be determined by weighing up [...] quantitative and qualitative factors (standard of living and quality of life), and must therefore be decided by political dialogue.

This is a disadvantage in terms of model-theoretical practicability, but it corresponds to reality to a much greater extent than the reduction of economic action to monetized and commercial processes” (Hauchler 1985, 56). On the problem of relating quantity and quality to each other in society, see Creydt 2024.
Deliberative democracy

The full reality of work and consumption can only be realized in public deliberation and in the change of perspective between workers, customers and those indirectly affected by work and consumption.

This is what constitutes the educational dimension of public deliberation, debate and consultation (= deliberation) in the context of a deliberative democracy (cf. Barber 1994). It forms the fifth moment of alternative socialization.

In it, the population enters into a practical self-assessment or reflection and thus becomes the “mediator” between needs and production. The inhabitants then anticipate the problematic consequences, conditions and implications, for example, of the generalization of car traffic (“car-friendly city”).

This enables the situation to be overcome in which the population remains the dependent variable of a short-sighted mutual increase in production and demand.

In the joint public consideration and deliberation of the common, conflicts arise

between workers and consumers (e.g. on the question of how many consumer goods are offered and how many resources are used to increase the quality of work as a lifetime),
between producers and consumers on the one hand, and those affected by their indirect consequences on the other, in order to avert a coalition of the labor and consumption sectors at the expense of care activities (relationships with children, the sick and the elderly) or ecology
between experts and laypeople (e.g. with the question of how much specialization is necessary, and what losses of everyday judgment and competence are associated with it, and how this can be counteracted).

A claimed political supremacy over the economy remains precarious as long as the latter is considered to be both self-referential and self-dynamic in the main, and also external to the world of life (or as its only external condition). Those who are merely in government can, at best, distribute the results of the economy in a different way.

It is something else to fundamentally change the way in which human capabilities are formed within the context of work, consumption and social relations. Only then does the field of post-capitalist wealth open up. Lothar Kühne (1985, 224) rightly states that this “new wealth” is something different “than the mere absence of the old poverty.”
Awareness of the social whole as a whole

What the product or service “does” to the “customer” in terms of developing his or her human potential cannot be adequately deduced from the bilateral relationship. It is necessary to visualize the multilateral relationships.

For joint deliberation, consideration and decision-making, scenarios are needed that show how the various sectors or social areas provide services for each other, how they depend on each other and on overarching conditions, how they benefit from them or contribute to their reproduction, and what negative or positive feedback loops exist.

One of these scenarios visualizes how the elimination of the central wastefulness that characterizes the capitalist market economy makes it possible to finance the expansion or reorganization of previously neglected areas.

The sixth moment of alternative socialization consists of such scenarios. They visualize how the various concrete qualities are mutually dependent and how they are interdependent, how they promote or limit each other.

It is “a new system of reference, by which people can coordinate themselves with each other in a new way, which they cannot do without a third reference” (Priddat 2008, 69).

This new center between people in the post-capitalist society consists of a meaningful network of different types of work, objects and areas. Only this substantial change, not the mere change of government, will remove the basis for the economy's independence from the population.
Being in the world

The society of the good life involves a different way of being in society for the individual. The individual does not just want to enjoy the advantages of the division of labor and participate in the wealth that is made possible solely by the direct and indirect interaction of many actors (only then does a higher standard of living arise than in largely self-sufficient farm households or local communities with their commons).

In the society of good living, the individual wants and is able to be a social being for another reason. He or she becomes aware that fruitful interaction with others – beyond the circle of close circles – as well as public deliberation, consideration and shaping of the community contributes significantly to the development of his or her human potential.

This too is part of the necessary transformation of cognitive and normative self-evident truths within the framework of an alternative socialization.
Public spirit

Social production and reproduction are then examined to see how people “produce” human capabilities and subjectivity through many social mediations. They do this

by producing certain goods with certain contents of invitation and possibility,
by developing a certain subjectivity in the work itself,
by entering into certain social relationships through the way in which they do business, which also have an impact on their so-called private lives.

The society of the good life overcomes a view of the self and the world in which individuals understand society as a marathon of negotiations between their interests or between their special concerns as members of particular groups.

In contrast, the society of good living is about the relationship between people in their everyday practice, which pursues the following question: How do they directly and indirectly do something for each other by contributing to the formation of human capabilities? How can they participate in this “general work that is created by the actions of all and everyone as their unity” (Hegel 3, 325)?

The new wealth of alternative socialization is found in the way we work and live together, in the way we challenge and inspire each other, in the interplay and synergy of the various “life activities” (Marx) – work, care activities, the development of senses in objects outside of work, consumption, social relationships and the shaping of society by the population.

In view of the interconnectedness and structure of these moments, private interests and business efficiency appear as selective and particular perspectives. Thinking outside of this interconnectedness and structure means thinking poorly in the abstract. Such thinking is like theory to practice:

To assert abstractions in reality is to destroy reality.
Hegel 20, 331

Literature

Barber, Benjamin 1994: Strong Democracy – Participation in the Political. Hamburg

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Ten reasons why Putin might prefer a compromise peace
by Geoffrey Roberts
[This article posted on 5/29/2024 is translated from the German on the Internet, https://www.telepolis.de/features/Zehn-Gruende-warum-Putin-einen-Kompromissfrieden-Vorzug-geben-koennte-9738166.html.]

10x Putin with a dove of peace

One of the leading narratives in the West is that Moscow is aggressive and expansionist. But there are arguments against this too. A guest article.

On May 23, 2024, Roberts published an article on the British website Brave New Europe – an English-language website for critical thinking and alternatives to neoliberalism – in which he discusses ten reasons why Russian President Putin might prefer the risks of a compromise peace to the costs of a long war with Ukraine and the West.1
First: Russian losses

BBC Mediazona research shows that Russia has so far lost 60,000 to 70,000 soldiers in the Ukraine war – four times as many as in ten years of war in Afghanistan and almost as many as the US in Vietnam.

Russia's strategies and tactics for maintaining its armed forces are geared towards minimizing the number of casualties, but the complete conquest of the Donbass could cost thousands more Russian lives.

Taking Kharkov and Odessa would be even more costly. Military overrunning and subsequent occupation of all of western Ukraine would require the mobilization of an additional hundred thousand soldiers.

The number of Ukrainian casualties is far higher than that of Russia – at least 200,000 to 250,000 and perhaps even 500,000 military deaths are to be considered. A hasty collapse of the Ukrainian military is now possible, but Kiev could probably continue to fight for a longer period of time with Western support.
Secondly: the nuclear threat

A nuclear war also threatens the existence of Russia and the rest of the world. The escalation of the war into a full-scale NATO-Russia conflict remains a real possibility.

The danger of hostilities in which nuclear weapons could be used, or of a catastrophic incident involving Ukrainian (or Russian) nuclear power plants, has never been as great as it is today.
Thirdly: A change of regime in Kiev

The current Ukrainian regime will remain in power as long as the war continues. Only peace negotiations can lead to its replacement. Its replacement by an even more radical ultranationalist government is possible, but would call into question Western support – without which Ukraine cannot survive as a state.

There is a good chance that a successor regime will swallow the bitter pill of a peace settlement, which would suit Russia. It would be a result that the Ukrainian public would hate but accept as the least bad alternative.
Fourth: Russian public opinion

poll data shows that the majority of Russian citizens will support the war for as long as it takes, but the Russians also want ceasefire and peace negotiations as soon as possible.

The westernized parts of the Russian elite are keeping quiet, but they too will go in the same direction if a possible peace solution appears on the horizon.

A small but vocal and not insignificant minority of Russians will want to see the war expanded until a complete victory over Ukraine and the West is achieved. However, Putin's power and popularity can limit the influence of these so-called “turbo-patriots”, although they could hinder peace negotiations.
Fifth: Pressure from the Global South

Russia's friends, allies, partners and supporters in the Global South reject a long war and want a ceasefire as soon as possible. If Ukraine and the West were to start pushing for peace negotiations, China, India, Brazil, South Africa and other independent actors will be an impressive lobby, urging Putin to pick up the ball and start negotiations.
Sixth: Reconstruction of the annexed territories

Retaining Crimea and the four other annexed provinces is Russia's minimum goal in the current war.

While this goal seems to be as good as guaranteed, it is to be feared that it will be a Pyrrhic victory, because Moscow will not be able to rebuild and resettle the devastated country in southern and eastern Ukraine in the near future. The longer the war lasts, the more gigantic this task will become.

Putin went to war to eliminate the growing Ukrainian military Nato bridgehead on Russia's borders, but also to protect the pro-Russian Ukrainians. Ending the war could be the best way to secure their lives and existence.
Seventh: Slavic solidarity

Putin's claim in July 2021 that Russians and Ukrainians are essentially one people has caused outrage in some Western circles, although it was a statement that about 40 percent of Ukrainian citizens agreed with at the time.

Russia has waged the war under the banner of multinationalism, not mono-ethnic nationalism. It has generally treated its Ukrainian opponents with respect.

Russia, on the other hand, has labeled Ukrainian neo-Nazis and ultra-nationalists, corrupt officials, exploitative oligarchs and those who have aligned themselves with Western interests as its enemies.

From this perspective, Russia should be seeking to heal the wounds of war that it has inflicted on a people that it still regards as a brother nation. At best, the healing will take a very long time, and a long war could make the rift between Russia and Russia Ukraine unbridgeable for generations.
Eight: Restoring trade relations between Russia and the West

Russia has withstood the Western sanctions war very well. Russia's war economy is booming and has surpassed Western arms manufacturers. New relationships and markets have been forged with the Global South. Russia now has more economic and technological sovereignty than before the war.

China, Russia and the non-Western world are challenging the US's global financial hegemony. But the Western sanctions hurt – especially ordinary Russians – and the pain is likely to increase in the medium to long term.

Detached from and in conflict with the West, Russia has shown that it can survive and even thrive, but greater opportunities for the prosperity of the Russian population would arise if the Western sanctions were ended and the former trade relations were resumed.
Ninth: Global cooperation

Russia and the West need each other to jointly address and overcome a variety of pressing problems such as the proliferation of nuclear weapons, cross-border crime and international terrorism, catastrophic environmental problems, health threats, global poverty and social inequality.
Tenth: The emergence of a new world order

Russia is seeking a new international system based on sovereignty, multipolarity, multilateralism, mutual security, respect for international law and the reorientation and revitalization of global and regional institutions.
Read also from Geoffrey Roberts:
The 10 most common propaganda claims about the Ukraine war – explained briefly
Telepolis
How far will he go? Putin's territorial ambitions in Ukraine
Telepolis

Russia's vision of the future also includes the recognition of spheres of influence for the major powers, which should help to ensure that law and justice can be secured for all states in the same way.

The successful creation of such a new global and multipolar world order also depends on Russia, but it requires that it avoid the nightmare of a long-lasting war in Ukraine, which would make the Orwellian dystopia of a permanently divided world into warring and mutually antagonistic power blocs a reality.

Geoffrey Roberts is a British historian and Emeritus Professor of History at University College Cork in Ireland, specializing in Soviet foreign policy and military history. He is a member of the Royal Irish Academy (RIA), Ireland's leading body of experts in the natural and social sciences.

Telepolis has published several of the scientist's articles on the war in Ukraine. At the beginning of February, for example, he published an article in which he briefly and convincingly dealt with the ten most common Western propaganda theories about the war in Ukraine.

This article is also noteworthy because, in an exclusive report dated May 24, 2024, the international news agency Reuters reported, citing five unnamed high-ranking Russian sources, that Russian President Vladimir Putin was ready to call a ceasefire in the war in Ukraine and freeze the fighting along the current front lines.

Our author Klaus-Dieter Kolenda has translated this article into German with the kind permission of Geoffrey Roberts.

Klaus-Dieter Kolenda, Prof. Dr. med., specialist in internal medicine – gastroenterology, specialist in physical and rehabilitative medicine/social medicine, was head physician of a rehabilitation clinic for diseases of the cardiovascular system, the respiratory tract, the metabolism and the musculoskeletal system from 1985 to 2006. Since 1978, he has been working as a medical expert for the social courts in Schleswig-Holstein. He also works with the Kiel group of the IPPNW (International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War and for Social Responsibility). E-mail: klaus-dieter.kolenda@gmx.de
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The 10 most common propaganda theories about the Ukraine war – explained briefly
February 4, 2024 Geoffrey Roberts
[This article posted on 2/4/2024 is translated from the German on the Internet, https://www.telepolis.de/features/Die-10-gaengigsten-Propaganda-Thesen-zum-Ukraine-Krieg-kurz-erklaert-9617603.html?seite=all.]

Questionable analogy, here in Latvia in 2014. Image: Observe The Banana, CC BY-NC 2.0

Geoffrey Roberts on narratives about the Ukraine war and Russia. Criticism of historical comparisons. Because they can have devastating consequences.

What are the main points of the propaganda that keeps the doomed war in Ukraine going while the world is confronted with Ukraine's defeat? Geoffrey Roberts has summarized and explained some of the most important propaganda narratives.

Roberts is an emeritus professor of history at University College Cork and a member of the Royal Irish Academy.
#1: Putin ≠ Hitler: A myth debunked

This frequently used false analogy is outrageous and has no factual basis.

Putin is not a maniacal, genocidal, warmongering dictator. He is not a racist or militarist seeking to dominate Europe or the world. He also does not have a messianic ideology that drives him to remake the world in the image of Russia.

Putin's geopolitical ambitions are remarkably conservative: security and respect for Russia and its civilization, a peaceful and prosperous, multipolar world of sovereign states, in which there is a balance of interests, mediated and harmonized by multilateral institutions such as the United Nations.

Such aspirations only appear radical in the context of the West's crumbling global hegemony.
#2: Stalin equals Putin? A questionable equation

Putin was shaped in the Soviet system after Stalin's death, but he has not been a communist since the late 1980s. As he said not long after taking office as president of the Russian Federation, anyone who does not regret the destruction of the Soviet Union has no heart, and anyone who wants it back has no brain.

In the 1990s, he was a pro-Western liberal, but today his ideology is Christian and capitalist, not Marxist or socialist.

He wields enormous power in Russian politics, but does not preside over a totalitarian party dictatorship, as Stalin did.

The Russian Federation's soft authoritarianism bears no resemblance to the mass repression of the Stalin era, nor is it comparable to the much less violent but equally repressive one-party state of Stalin's communist successors.

Patriotism, multinationalism, internationalism and love of history are what Putin actually has in common with Stalin, but not that he is a dictator.
#3: Munich syndrome – historical misinterpretation

This most popular and damaging of all historical false analogies is based on the claim that the betrayal of Czechoslovakia in the Munich Agreement of September 1938 shows that aggressors cannot be appeased.

The problem at the time was not appeasement policy itself, but the fact that Hitler was out for a world war and did not want to be appeased.

Stalin was the leader the British and French should have appeased, but they avoided a collective security alliance with the USSR in favor of deals with Nazi Germany.

Before invading Ukraine, Putin was desperately seeking an agreement with the West. That is why he proposed a comprehensive European security agreement between Russia and the West.

A few weeks after the war began, he sought a compromise peace that would have left Russia with a neutral and disarmed Ukraine on its doorstep, but with only a small gain in additional territory.

Moscow remains open to such negotiations, even if the price of peace is likely to be much higher today than it was two years ago.

The sooner Putin is appeased, the sooner the war will end and Ukraine will be spared further unnecessary suffering.
#4: The Prague analogy, a dangerous fallacy

This false analogy is an extension of the Munich syndrome. It claims that Hitler's occupation of Prague in March 1939 shows that if you give Putin an inch of territory, he will take a proverbial meter.

However, in 1939, Hitler's goal was the conquest of Poland, not Czechoslovakia. German troops invaded the country, ostensibly to restore order, because of an internal crisis that divided Slovakia and the Czech lands after the loss of the German-populated Sudetenland in Munich.


If Ukraine suffers a deep domestic crisis after its military defeat against Russia, the “restorers of order” in Lviv and Kiev will probably be Polish and Romanian troops.


The battered Ukraine, which is completely dependent on foreign aid, is more likely to be on the way to becoming a Western protectorate than a Russian one.
#5: Finland and the Winter War

This is not the worst of the false analogies, but it is more complicated to understand than its proponents might think.

The Finns wisely signed a peace treaty with the USSR in March 1940 to save the independence and sovereignty of their country.

But they had rejected a similar Soviet offer before the war broke out, which would have given them gains in the border region of Karelia in exchange for losses.

It was not the brave Finnish defense that stopped the Soviet attack, but Stalin's fear that a British-French military intervention could turn the country into the battlefield of a larger European war. This perspective would not have been favorable for the Finns either.

Finland could have remained a neutral country for the rest of the Second World War, but it catastrophically chose to ally itself with Nazi Germany in the so-called “Continuation War”.

The Finnish leadership redeemed itself by deploying its armed forces against the Germans in 1944 and then refusing to accept Western interference in its policy towards the Soviets.

This stance convinced Stalin and led to Finland being allowed to become a semi-independent member of the Soviet bloc.

A “Finlandization” – that is, internal autonomy in exchange for limited foreign policy sovereignty – would have been a far better model for an independent Ukraine than the divisive domestic path that led to its partition.
#6: Discourse on genocide and the Holocaust

Both sides have used the word “genocide”, but the atrocities committed during the Russian-Ukrainian war are in no way comparable to the mass murders of millions of Jews by the Nazis during World War II.

In fact, this war has been remarkably free of large-scale, systematic atrocities against civilians. The vast majority of war casualties have been soldiers. This is not to deny the immense suffering of millions of Ukrainian civilians, but as Gaza, Iraq, Syria, Libya and Afghanistan show, it could have been much worse.

The battle over the word “genocide” in propaganda obscures two essential facts about the actual Holocaust: the Holocaust began with the murder of one million Soviet Jews by the SS in 1941-1942 and ended with the liberation of the Nazi death camps by the Red Army in 1944-1945.
#7: Containment policy and the Cold War

In the face of Ukraine's defeat, Western hardliners are increasingly pushing for a long-term strategy to contain Russia, which involves a comprehensive militarization of their own societies and perhaps even the reintroduction of conscription.

But this re-emergence of the Cold War strategy has little to do with the views of the inventor of the containment concept, George F. Kennan, who saw this policy primarily as a political tool.

The US would not win the Cold War through confrontation and military competition with the USSR, but through the demonstrated superiority of its political system.

Kennan was, as is well known, one of the prominent US politicians who spoke out loudly against the post-Soviet eastward expansion of NATO. He also liked to quote the aphorism of President John Quincy Adams, according to which “America should not go abroad in search of monsters to destroy”.
#8: The domino theory, an overblown concept?

This theory was developed by President Eisenhower, partly for the purpose of getting the British government to join France in its lost colonial war in Indochina in the 1950s.

But Winston Churchill did not believe in the theory that the Red victory in Vietnam would lead to the rest of Southeast Asia falling to the Communists.

Nor did his Tory and Labour successors in the office of Prime Minister when the domino concept was revived in the 1960s to justify massive US intervention in the Vietnam War.

The current resurrection of this theory is that if Putin wins in Ukraine, the Baltic states will be his next target.

There is no evidence that Putin has such intentions. Undoubtedly, Russia could occupy the Baltics if it wanted to, but not without risking a nuclear war with Nato.

Putin's invasion of Ukraine was risky and adventurous, but his restrained conduct of the war has shown that he is anything but reckless – unlike some of his Western counterparts, who have taken every opportunity to escalate the conflict.
#9: The Korean stalemate scenario

The Korean War came to a halt fairly quickly after a few dramatic months of invasion and counter-invasion in the summer and fall of 1950, but a ceasefire was not signed until July 1953.

Some Western hardliners are longing for a repeat of this scenario and hope that hostilities can resume as soon as Ukraine has regained its strength and NATO countries have ramped up their arms industry.

But the war in Ukraine is not a stalemate, as some claim, but a war of attrition that Russia is slowly but surely winning.

Furthermore, Putin will never agree to a ceasefire that does not guarantee Russia's security and secure this situation vis-à-vis Ukraine's supporters.

The longer the war lasts, the more likely it is that a Russian victory will lead to a dictatorial peace imposed by Russia.
#10: Proxy wars – the new global threat?

There are many conflicts that are referred to as proxy wars, in different scales and forms.

The Russian-Ukrainian war has some similarities with the Spanish Civil War, the Korean War, the Vietnam War and the Soviet war in Afghanistan, but its scale, scope, intensity and danger are unprecedented.

The war in Ukraine is simultaneously a civil war between Ukrainian nationalists and pro-Russian Ukrainians, an interstate war between Ukraine and the Russian Federation, and a proxy war against Russia led by the West.

Without Western military, economic and political support, Ukraine would have already lost the war.

It is the West's overarching anti-Russian and anti-Putin objectives that have prolonged the war and could turn it into a truly existential conflict for all of us in the future.

Geoffrey Roberts is a British historian and Emeritus Professor of History at University College Cork in Ireland, specializing in Soviet foreign policy and military history. He is a member of the Royal Irish Academy (RIA), Ireland's leading body of experts in the natural and social sciences.

At the end of August 2023, he published an initial article on the war in Ukraine on the British website “Brave New Europe”. In this article, Roberts put forward the thesis that the Ukrainian counteroffensive had already failed and that the West could limit the damage if it entered into negotiations with Moscow.

A few days ago, another article by Roberts was published on the same website, entitled “Ignorance is not Bliss: Ten Egregious Historical Mis-Analogies of the Russo-Ukrainian War”.

This article takes a critical look at the content of Western propaganda, which is enabling the continuation of the disastrous and threatening war in Ukraine. Telepolis is publishing the text in German under a new title.

Roberts' arguments are similar to those of US academic Jeffrey Sachs on the causes and background of the war in Ukraine.

According to Sachs, the terrible war in Ukraine, which is threatening the lives of all of us, is above all a proxy war for NATO expansion, which could have been ended long ago if the USA and the West had been willing to take Russia's legitimate security interests seriously and to take them into account.

Translator: Klaus-Dieter Kolenda, Prof. Dr. med., specialist in internal medicine – gastroenterology, specialist in physical and rehabilitative medicine/social medicine, was head physician of a rehabilitation clinic for diseases of the cardiovascular system, respiratory tract, metabolism and musculoskeletal system from 1985 to 2006. He has been working as a medical expert for the social courts in Schleswig-Holstein since 1978. He also works with the Kiel group of the IPPNW (International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War and for Social Responsibility). E-mail: klaus-dieter.kolenda@gmx.de

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