Neoliberalism cannot create industrial policy
What we can learn from China
By Ian Welsh
[This
article posted on July 16, 2024 is translated from the German on the
Internet,
https://makroskop.eu/25-2024/neoliberalismus-kann-keine-industriepolitik/.]
Washington
spent $7.5 billion on electric vehicle charging stations. The result?
Seven stations were built. What this says about our economic system.
When
China subsidizes electric vehicle charging stations, they get built.
Reliable figures are hard to come by, but one source puts the total at
around $10 billion. How many charging stations are there in China? Over
seven million, of which 2.2 million are public. By comparison, there are
just 186,200 stations in the US.
Chinese
electric vehicles are sold from the factory for about eleven to twelve
thousand dollars, but in the West, dealers charge many times that amount
and pocket the profit. So if you want a cheap electric vehicle, you
have to figure out how to buy it in China and import it yourself, which
is very difficult in most Western countries.
It
is amusing that the USA is planning to impose import duties of 100
percent on Chinese electric vehicles – but even then they would still be
cheaper and would be sold at a profit by Chinese electric vehicle
manufacturers. Even if it remains very difficult in practice to get
Chinese electric vehicles in America.
A
Western journalist specializing in electric cars recently traveled to
China and tested the Chinese models. The article is long and worth
reading. The bottom line: Chinese electric cars are – contrary to
expectations – better and cheaper than comparable Western cars.
But
back to the original topic: As the title suggests, you can't pursue
industrial policy in neoliberalism, let alone a war economy. Russia
has massively increased its weapons and ammunition production during
the Ukraine war without any problems. The West? Hardly at all.
Washington
is spending 7.5 billion US dollars on 7 charging stations, reports the
Washington Post. That is not only incompetent, it is corruption. Yes,
there is corruption in China and Russia too, a lot of it. But
that is nothing compared to American and European corruption – it is
not even in the same order of magnitude. This may sound absurd. But in
China in particular, most corruption is "honest corruption" – in other
words, you cut yourself a slice of the cake, but you actually deliver.
If a certain number of houses or charging stations are specified, they
will be produced.
The
corruption described in the example of the American charging stations,
on the other hand, is a product of neoliberalism. Neoliberalism is about
unearned profits. This is most evident in the stock market and the real
estate sector. In the post-war period, the stock market moved sideways.
The indices basically did not rise at all. With the era of
neoliberalism since the 1980s, they then rose inexorably. The
strange thing is that GDP growth was higher in the post-war period; so
stock prices have not risen since 1980 because of better economic
performance, but because of government policy, which was mainly driven
by the Federal Reserve.
The thing about unearned profits applies not only to real estate and stock prices, but to almost everything. During
the neoliberal era, profit margins have skyrocketed. Our corporations
no longer compete on price or quality, but instead try to create
oligopolies or monopolies so that they can charge more money without
having to provide any significant added value. The way Covid was
exploited to raise prices much faster than costs increased is
instructive.
In
other words, neoliberalism is about unearned money: capital gains;
high-frequency trading with AI, where you buy a company with debt,
burden it with debt and then dump it; monopolies and oligopolies and
getting the government to inflate asset prices or pay far more than
certain goods are worth (see military-industrial complex).
Read also:
Light-speed transactions
Tiago Cardão-Pito | April 23, 2024
Of
course, there are exceptions, but even these are rather partial. Apple
has developed some truly new products, but at the same time they are
trying to get monopoly prices for them. Almost
the entire internet, which was built as a common good, has been turned
into a fenced-in garden; small producers have been marginalized while
their products have been stolen. AI is little more than a machine for
stealing intellectual property, aimed at small producers – writers and
artists.
But let's get back to the impossibility of industrial
policy: neoliberal ideology explicitly rejected tariffs and called for
free capital flows. Money
flowed to the places with the highest returns, regardless of which
country. Capital goods and know-how were exported. Until recently, China
was a low-cost producer, so the West got involved in exploiting wage
cost advantages and moved production facilities there. Apple, for
example, developed the iPhones and iPads with the support and know-how
of the US government, but produced them almost entirely in China because
it was cheaper there.
The
problem is that engineers learn best in the factory. So when the West
moved most of its production to China, the Chinese learned. After all,
they were the ones actually making the goods. And now Huawei's phones
are competing with those of Apple and Samsung. They have developed their
own operating system. Their chips are not quite as good yet, but they
are on the way.
As
I have said many times, innovation inevitably moves to the world's
manufacturing centers, but with a time lag. It took about forty years
for America to overtake the UK. In the case of China/USA, it seems to be
about twenty years. That means it has already happened.
For
about six years now, I have been hearing complaints from the Chinese
that it is no longer possible to buy a house. Their housing market, like
ours, has been bought up by investors, pushing out young people. What
was the Chinese response? They allowed their housing market to collapse
and the government stepped in: millions of social housing units are
planned, and by 2030 they are to dominate the entire housing supply. The
state is becoming the largest builder of residential buildings.
China
has repeatedly proven that it can implement policies that are good for
the majority, even if they harm the rich. In our case, the opposite has
been repeatedly proven.
A
successful industrial policy is not feasible if it is based solely on
the pursuit of fictitious profits and the production of really good new
goods at low prices. If an entire society is based on the principle of
"give me money for the least possible effort", you are in trouble.
China's
government is by no means free of serious shortcomings, but it works –
and ours does not. This is because in China the government has been
prevented from being taken over by private interests. Yes,
China is undoubtedly a capitalist country. But the capitalism practiced
there is the kind that prevailed in the US in the 1950s and 1960s: you
can get rich, but you do it by producing real goods, not by speculating
on the financial markets. And you are expected to see incomes rise
faster than prices. The central promise is that ordinary people's lives
will improve.
The
West is finished. Finito. We can't compete. It's as simple as that. To
be competitive, Western economies have to reinvent themselves. The
introduction of tariffs, although not a bad idea in itself, is not
enough on its own. Unless
we change our government and economic policies, as well as our ideology
– namely, that in order to get rich and stay rich, you actually have to
make good, cheap new products that improve the lives of the majority –
we will never be able to compete.
A new era in American style
Letter from Brussels
By Eric Bonse
[This
article posted on July 16, 2024 is translated from the German on the
Internet, https://makroskop.eu/25-2024/zeitenwende-auf-amerikanisch/.]
The
EU blindly trusted US President Biden, made itself dependent on the US
and ignored the risk of a change of power in Washington. This is now
taking its toll – Brussels is not prepared for Trump 2.0. German
politicians are also to blame.
For
Brussels, Donald Trump is the man who wants to destroy NATO, betray
Ukraine and make a pact with Viktor Orban against the European Union. In
other words, he is the personification of evil. The bogeyman. The
father of all populists and nationalists, who under no circumstances
should be allowed to become president of the United States again.
But
now his victory in the fateful election in November has become even
more likely. The embarrassing slip of the tongue by President-elect Joe
Biden at the NATO summit and the failed assassination attempt on Trump
have tipped the mood in the US. Europeans are unpleasantly surprised –
they are hardly prepared for Trump 2.0.
Of
course, the prospect of Trump beating "Sleepy Joe" Biden has already
caused some changes. NATO, for example, has started to make itself not
only fit for war, but also "Trump-proof". And the EU wants to massively
rearm itself in order to supply Ukraine with weapons in the event of an
emergency, even if it has to do so alone.
But
so far, EU politicians have not really wanted to face up to what is
coming. They have not only ignored the risk of a change of power in
Washington, but also the deep crisis in which the USA finds itself. At
the same time, they have blindly trusted Biden and become all too
dependent on America in recent years.
Since
the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Brussels has coordinated every
important step with Washington. From the Russia sanctions to the import
of American liquefied natural gas to China policy – the Europeans have
become followers. They even allowed themselves to be shown up by Biden's
Inflation Reduction Act (IRA).
German
politicians are mainly to blame for this. EU Commission President
Ursula von der Leyen hangs on Biden's every word. German Chancellor Olaf
Scholz does not take a step without first checking with Biden. German
Minister of Economic Affairs Robert Habeck has swallowed the IRA without
a murmur, even though it is damaging to Germany and is attracting
companies away from the country.
Germany
wants a "servant leadership role" – and follows Biden's every word.
France, on the other hand, is calling for a "sovereign Europe". But
Paris cannot assert itself. The French attempts to counter the IRA or
create a "Buy European" clause have come to nothing. This is another
reason why the EU has become dependent.
This
was not so noticeable under Biden, because at least they were still
talking to each other. Under Trump, however, it could get brutal. If the
Republican – as he has threatened – passes on the costs of the Ukraine
war to the allies, forces the "decoupling" of China and seals off the US
market, Germany and the EU will really suffer.
The
Europeans are facing nothing less than a new "turning point" – this
time not because of Russia, but because of the USA. It brings with it
new dangers, new burdens and costs, but possibly also new opportunities –
for example, to end the war in Ukraine. It is also conceivable that the
EU will finally emancipate itself from the USA.
But
above all, German EU politicians have become so fixated on Biden and
cultivated the image of Trump as the enemy that they do not seem able to
change their minds. After the presidential election in the USA, they
want to pursue a Biden policy without Biden – if necessary, even against
Trump. That is why the old course is simply being continued.
But
it is not enough to freeze arms and financial aid to Ukraine at the
current level. It is not enough to boycott all possible and impossible
contacts with Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin, as the EU is
trying to do after the controversial Orban trips to Kiev, Moscow,
Beijing and Washington.
This
is an expression of helplessness, but not a sensible European policy.
It would be sensible to put the current course in US, Ukraine and Russia
policy to the test and to take initiatives ourselves before Trump does.
It would also be sensible to define European interests – independently
of the USA.
But
Germany is not the only country struggling with this. Poland, the
Baltic states and even the northern Europeans seem unable and unwilling
to formulate their policies without or even against the USA. For many
Europeans, the bond with America is a fateful necessity for historical
reasons; emancipation is a foreign concept for them.
Will
Trump bring about a change in thinking? The first signals from Brussels
are not very hopeful. There has been a lot of talk recently about
making the EU and NATO "Trump-proof". But the Europeans have not even
managed to build the much-vaunted "European pillar" in NATO. The US
continues to set the tone.
EU
policy is also anything but "Trump-proof". If the new president follows
through on his promise to take an ultra-nationalist and protectionist
course, the German and European economies will suffer even more. If he
also chooses confrontation with China and imposes unilateral sanctions,
things will get serious.
Then
we will see what a new era in American terms means. The German new era
due to the Ukraine war, on the other hand, will have been just a mild
breeze.
Eric Bonse is a political scientist and journalist. From 1994
to 2001, he worked for the "Tagesspiegel" and the "Handelsblatt" in
Paris. Since 2004, he has been reporting from Brussels as an EU
correspondent for various German media.
Déjà vu of the Cold War
US medium-range missiles
By Ulrike Simon
[This article posted on July 16, 2024 is translated from the German on the Internet, https://makroskop.eu/25-2024/deja-vu-an-den-kalten-krieg/,]
Demonstration against the NATO double-track decision in 1986
The
deployment of US medium-range missiles is reminiscent of the NATO
double-track decision of the 1980s. Is the decision a necessary response
to the Russian threat – or will it further escalate the New Cold War?
In
principle, the member of the Foreign Affairs Committee welcomes the
decision as the right response to the Russian escalation. In the context
of the conversion to a war economy, it is even intended to be only a
transitional measure until Germany receives long-range precision weapons
as part of its own military strategy. The German government also
welcomes the decision.
However,
contrary to the report in the newspaper Die Welt, the German government
has stated that this is not a NATO decision, but an agreement between
Germany and the USA. From 2026, the USA will station missiles aimed at
Russia in Germany, including Tomahawk cruise missiles with a range of
well over 2,000 kilometers, SM-6 anti-aircraft missiles and supersonic
weapons that are still in development. The
British and American armies have long used Tomahawks equipped with
conventional warheads as first-strike weapons. However, they are also
designed to carry nuclear warheads. The stated aim of the deployment is
to protect Germany and its European allies.
History always repeats itself twice...
Déjà
vu: 45 years ago, NATO's dual-track decision also provided for the
deployment of American medium-range missiles, not only Tomahawk cruise
missiles but also Pershing II ballistic missiles. At the time, it was
also said that there was no intention of escalating the situation, but
that the response was to the threat from the East.
In
contrast to today, however, there were mass protests. In Europe,
millions of people took to the streets. The demonstration in the
Hofgarten in Bonn alone counted around 350,000 participants. The plan
resulted in an agitated debate about NATO's deterrence strategy. Opponents
of the decision argued that it would lead to a new escalation of
nuclear armament and make Western Europe a target for a nuclear attack.
The missiles would not contribute to protection, but on the contrary
would increase the nuclear threat.
Despite
all the protests, the dual-track decision was implemented from 1983.
However, the dual character of the decision proved to be its strongest
argument: the deployment of missiles was linked to the task of entering
into disarmament negotiations. These initially failed. But supporters of
the decision argued that the deployment of medium-range missiles would
ultimately have forced the Soviet Union to give in.
Ultimately,
this was decisive in Gorbachev's agreement to one of the most important
disarmament agreements of the post-war period, the INF Treaty of 1987.
In it, the USA and the Soviet Union agreed to withdraw, destroy and ban
the production of all their land-based missiles capable of carrying
nuclear weapons with ranges of 500 to 5500 km and their carrier systems.
In May 1991, the superpowers scrapped their last missiles. Important control mechanisms came into force.
These
were effective for almost thirty years – until Donald Trump
unilaterally terminated the treaty in 2019. Russia had violated the
terms of the treaty, Trump said. Although it would have been possible to
verify the accusation within the framework of the agreements, this did
not happen. Russia,
for its part, accused the US of violating the INF Treaty by deploying
Aegis Ashore missile defense systems in Romania and Poland. This is
because the systems use Mk-41 vertical launchers that can be equipped
with Tomahawk missiles.
Trump's
successor, Joe Biden, left it at the termination. In the aftermath,
Moscow took several initiatives to reactivate the treaty. In September
2019, Putin proposed a moratorium on medium-range missiles, an offer
that he tried to expand in October 2020 without success.
Read also:
The future of US foreign policy: strength with or without values?
Ulrike Simon | July 10, 2024
Then,
in December 2021, Russia announced that it would be forced to deploy
medium-range missiles itself if the US continued to refuse to negotiate a
moratorium. NATO denied plans to deploy missiles at the time, but was
also not willing to negotiate and again accused Russia of violating the
agreement itself. In
June 2024, Putin announced that the previously banned missile systems
would now actually be produced. Germany and the USA are now selling
their plans to deploy missiles on German soil in response to Putin's
alleged lack of willingness to compromise, without taking into account
the long history of missed opportunities.
The
INF Treaty was not the first disarmament treaty to be unilaterally
terminated by the USA. President Bush had already terminated the ABM
Treaty in 2001. This treaty was signed by Washington and Moscow in 1972
to slow down the nuclear arms race. It prohibited both superpowers from
building national defense systems against long-range ballistic missiles
and from creating the basis for such a defense.
The
treaty was based on the assumption that one superpower would respond to
the other superpower's deployment of defensive systems by increasing
its offensive nuclear weapons in order to restore the balance of power.
The superpowers would therefore quickly move towards an endless
offensive-defensive arms race in which each would try to counter the
other's actions.
As
late as the 1990s, all parties involved were aware that a nuclear first
strike by the United States or Russia against the other side would
result in an unstoppable reaction that would devastate both countries
and confront the world with a possible nuclear winter. In other words: a
balance of terror.
However,
while Russia systematically developed and built antiballistic defense
systems, the US – contrary to George W. Bush's original intention –
focused on the war on terror after 9/11. A new study sponsored by the
American Physical Society concludes that the US systems for intercepting
intercontinental ballistic missiles cannot even defend against a
limited nuclear strike. Consequently, it is unlikely that they will function reliably within the next 15 years.
This
changes the fundamental strategic situation: it is quite possible that
Russia could – albeit at great sacrifice – repel an American nuclear
first strike. Russia is also ahead in the field of supersonic weapons,
as former CIA employee Larry Johnson reports. A
large part of this may be Russian propaganda, but Johnson is not the
only one to claim that Russia is a stronger opponent in terms of
armaments than it was in Gorbachev's time.
Read also:
The USA must break new ground
Ulrike Simon | July 5, 2024
No sign of de-escalation
Kiesewetter
and other supporters of the current missile deployment not only
"forget" the long history that led to the Russian medium-range missile
decision, but also seem to underestimate the real nuclear threat and the
opponent. And – unlike in the 1980s – there was no mention of
negotiations with Russia at the latest NATO meeting. On
the contrary: NATO continues to rule out talks with Putin, Orbán is
being sharply criticized for his peace initiative, and the EU is
boycotting his presidency.
Showing strength may be a political
instrument; if it ultimately succeeds in forcing the opponent to the
negotiating table and thus avoiding a hot war, it is based on rational
considerations that could make the world more peaceful.
A
policy of escalation, on the other hand, which in a dispute with a
nuclear power is uncompromising and aims for victory without a realistic
basis, is irresponsible. Not only do the plans to admit Japan to NATO
represent a further provocation. It also remains uncertain when the
hoped-for German "precision weapons" will be available, with which
Kiesewetter believes he can force Russia to its knees independently of
the USA. Visit Europe (while it still stands).[1]
------------------------
[1]This
song by the band Geiersturzflug was popularized by the peace movement
and became one of the most successful songs of the "Neue Deutsche
Welle".
Ulrike Simon taught English, politics and economics in
various school types and levels for almost 40 years. Since her
retirement, she has been working as a freelance author and translator.
She is a member of the MAKROSKOP editorial team.
Majority principle
Majority voting: a fundamental defect of democracy
By Werner Polster
[This
article posted on July 16, 2024 is translated from the German on the
Internet,
https://makroskop.eu/25-2024/mehrheitswahlrecht-grunddefekt-der-demokratie/.]
It
flared up briefly during the recent elections in the UK and France, and
then disappeared again into the political abyss: the highly problematic
majority principle in the form of the corresponding electoral law.
The
majority voting system has created something in the political system
that is impossible in mathematics, as far as we know: minorities become
majorities. A
problem that is recognized on the surface, but at best discussed in a
technocratic manner, then dismissed and filed away. The MWR, but more
generally the political principle of generating majorities, is not
fundamentally problematized, although it – together with the resulting
structures of state building (federalism) and the system of government
(presidential system) – is one of the fundamental defects of modern
democracy.
France: the logic of the lesser evil
Let
us begin with France in the second round of the election. In the
presidential election, only the two top-placed candidates from the first
round of voting go through to the second round. It is different in the
parliamentary election, where all candidates from the first round of
voting, in which no absolute majority was achieved, can run again. At
this point, the left-wing parties resorted to the tricks of the MWR to
prevent the Rassemblement National (RN) from winning the constituency:
all the significant differences in content were brushed aside, and the
Nouveau Front populaire "agreed" on a "common" candidate. The
results of the two rounds of voting for the Assemblée Nationale show
that the RN, which received well over a third of the votes, only came
third in the distribution of seats. This means that the political
proportions in the electorate are not turned upside down, but they are
also not reflected.
The
MWR has an even more bizarre effect in the French presidential
elections. In the 2022 presidential election, Emmanuel Macron received
around 25 percent of the vote. In the second round, the logic of the
lesser evil took hold, as it did in the recent parliamentary elections.
In the second round against Marine Le Pen, he achieved an absolute
majority. The lesser evil as a democratic elite selection?
And
then people in Europe wonder why Macron is so unpopular. The question
is wrongly posed, he has never been popular. Even in the first round of
the 2017 election, Macron did not get more than 25 percent of the vote. Strictly
speaking, if Macron ends his presidency in 2027, he will have been the
president of only a quarter of the French population, and even less if
you take into account the turnout. However, he, who had only received
the approval of a quarter of the population out of conviction, was able
to implement a pension reform affecting the entire population and other
socio-political restructuring measures in the meantime.
Great Britain: straight into a minority government
The
majority voting system in the UK has some absurd effects. The Labour
Party won about a third of the votes nationwide, but has a two-thirds
majority of seats in the House of Commons. This is the mathematical
miracle mentioned at the beginning. The electoral system, which is
supposed to ensure quick and clear majorities, leads directly to a
minority government.
The
representation of smaller parties is also strange: the right-wing
extremist Reform UK received 14 percent of the votes nationwide, but
only has five seats in the House of Commons, while the Liberal Democrats
received 12 percent of the votes nationwide and have 72 seats in
parliament. The British population will rub their eyes after the
election, and it can be assumed that they will hardly recognize their
parliament.
Argentina: the logic of despair
Presidential
systems, such as the one in Argentina, are inherently tied to the
majority voting system. The example of Javier Mileis shows what
presidential systems and the MWR can lead to. According
to civilized political criteria, a politician who wants to abolish the
welfare state and the central bank, including the national currency, in
his statements and program – and if you take his professed
libertarianism at face value, he wants to destroy and abolish the state –
is outside the realm of democracy. He is not seeking a political
dictatorship in the conventional sense, but a kind of market
dictatorship.
USA: political perversion
The
area of political perversion is entered with the majority voting system
in the USA. In the upcoming presidential elections in November 2024, a
nationwide election can actually be dispensed with, since in the final
analysis it is not the entire population of the USA that decides on the
new president, but rather the outcome of the election in five or six
individual states (currently probably of particular importance:
Wisconsin), the so-called swing states, is decisive. This
is where another anti-democratic principle, federalism, comes into
play: it is not the individual votes of the electorate that decide, but
rather who has won the electors in the individual states, with the votes
for the losing candidate being "lost".
This
sometimes leads – as was the case in the 2016 election – to the result
that the losing candidate may have more (individual) votes, but fewer
electoral votes. The result was that Donald Trump was elected and
Hillary Clinton withdrew from the field as the loser. The same thing happened in the 2000 presidential election, when Al Gore received more votes than his opponent George W. Bush.
Another
peculiarity of the majority voting system can be seen at the level of
the elections to the House of Representatives. The parties that govern
the individual states, i.e. the Republicans and Democrats, carve up the
electoral districts (increasingly digitally "calculated") in such a way
that they are guaranteed a majority in each case. The
political process is called gerrymandering, after its inventor Elbridge
Gerry in Massachusetts (1812) and the emergence of salamander-like
shapes in the electoral districts. It means that there are hardly any
"open" constituencies left. The manipulation of electoral districts –
explicitly allowed by the highest courts – is unique to the majority
voting system.
In
all these forms of majority voting (in presidential elections, in
federal states and in electoral districts), whether in France, the UK or
the USA, it must always be borne in mind that it is not social or
popular majorities that are expressed in the elections, but – since only
a part of the population usually goes to the polls – often enough
minorities. It
can happen, for example in the glorious leader of the West, that with
an election turnout of just over 50 percent (or even less, as in the
Clinton election in 1996) and a presidential candidate winning by just
over 50 percent, a candidate comes into office who is supported by only a
quarter of the population or less. This
happened, for example, in 2000, when George W. Bush became president.
Incidentally, voter turnout in the model democracy has been below 60
percent for fifty years.
The presidential system – like an elective monarchy
If
we turn to the system of government, we encounter another fundamental
defect of Western democracies, the presidential system. The
pure presidential system with a strong president, as implemented in the
USA and France, but also the weakened version, as in Poland and
Austria, has little to do with democracy. On the scale of government
systems, it is in the immediate vicinity of the elective monarchy and is
hardly compatible with a democracy that is only conceivable as a
parliamentary one. Power should not be vested in an individual, but only
in the people's representatives, the parliament.
Presidential
systems are closely linked to the majority voting system, either
through the direct election of the president by the people (France) or
indirectly via a federal intermediate step (USA). The presidential
system as it is practiced in the USA is absurd from the outset, as it
cuts away the equality of the voters at the federal level. The
presidential system à la française – absolute majority in the first
round (which has never occurred in the Fifth Republic) or absolute
majority in the second round, in which only the two candidates with the
highest number of votes in the first round compete – only becomes
apparent in its questionable nature later on. If
no absolute majority is achieved in the first round of voting, the
electorate is either driven into the logic of the lesser evil (France)
or into the logic of despair (Argentina) – both of which are
unconvincing political constellations.
Majority
voting – whether in its parliamentary or presidential form – can, but
does not necessarily, lead to a two-party system. It opens the door to
extreme decisions, primarily of an economic nature, such as the
Thatcherite economic policy after 1979 or the ongoing restructuring
process in Argentina. They
are also not immune to keeping antidemocratic forces out of power,
namely when the logic of the lesser evil or the logic of despair no
longer works in the hoped-for sense (Argentina). Trump would be king, if
he were re-elected, not only since the recent decision of the Supreme
Court. US presidents have always been kings, which is particularly
piquant in view of the historical founding process of the USA.
In
this context, the events in Italy at the moment are also interesting,
where Giorgia Meloni's party is seeking a constitutional amendment that
would result in a mixture of a presidential and parliamentary system, a
primato. All this under the guise of democracy. The
future head of government, according to the Fratelli, should be elected
in a direct vote, which would enormously raise his or her position in
the system of government, and one who had come to office by plebiscite ,
a head of government who would wield power equivalent to that of a
president in a purely presidential system, and perhaps even more than
that, because the parliament would be marginalized even more by the
power of the prime minister. It is vaguely recalled that a similar
project was already in existence in the German Reich from 1934.
The sympathies of the right-wing radicals for presidential systems are well known. The
underlying calculation is that parliamentary majorities are less likely
than majorities via majority voting. But here too, one should not be
deceived: the right tends to align with the radical right rather than
with the left, as there are plenty of examples of this in history and in
the present. One can look up to the north, where one encounters
liaisons between the right and the radical right, but one can also look
to the west and south.
Nowhere
do you encounter a firewall, which is a specifically German
architectural construction. For well-known, but not readily mentioned
reasons, reminiscent of the year 1933. And: the hijacking of the right
by the right-wing radicals (USA) is also a danger known from the
present. This also includes the long-running process of decline of
moderate right-wing parties in Europe.
Only
France allows itself a presidential system in its strongest form.
France of all countries, the first European country to abolish the
monarchy. It is time to abolish this anachronism, this fossil from the
Gaullist era, and to return to France's once-renowned parliamentary
tradition. This
would require a debate within France. However, it should also be
debated within the framework of a new European domestic policy, just as
it would be obvious to bury the silly remains of the monarchy in six EU
member states.
Lost core elements of democracy
In
the course of its history, democracy has lost its two core elements at
the grassroots level: 1) the idea of the equality of voters and 2) the
idea of representation, which necessarily follows from the idea of
popular sovereignty.
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